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Abstract: Most computer systems are secured using a login id and password.  When computers are connected to 
the internet, they become more vulnerable as more machines are available to attack them.  In this paper, we 
present a novel method for protecting/enhancing login protection that can reduce the potential threat of internet 
connected computers.  Our method is based on and enhancement to login id/password based on keystroke 
dynamics.  We employ a novel authentication algorithm based on a probabilistic neural network.  Our results 
indicate that we can achieve an equal error rate of less than 5%, comparable to what is achieved with hardware 
based solutions such as fingerprint scanners and facial recognition systems. 
 
   
1. Introduction 
 
The traditional method for authentication in 
most information systems that are computer 
based is the login/password (e.g. class C security 
minimum). There are countless reports on how 
such class C protected devices have been 
breached, resulting in financial losses and a 
dimunition in the faith people have when 
transacting business over the internet (Peacock, 
2004). Researchers and industry alike have 
sought ways to enhance the security of 
computers that currently house major financial 
and scientific data throughout the world.  A new 
industry has been created – with the sole 
purpose of providing enhanced protection from 
piracy – the biometrics industry. Currently, there 
are two major forms of biometrics: those based 
on physiological attributes such as fingerprints, 
iris, and retinal scanners and behavioural 
biometrics: based on voice recognition, 
signature verification and keystroke dynamics 
(see Jain, 2001, 2003 for a nice review).   
Physiological biometrics is based on the 
notion of what we are – we each possess unique 
fingerprints (even identical twins differ in their 
fingerprint patters) and are therefore thought to 
be spoof proof.  But current literature reports 
indicate that fingerprints can be spoofed (Jain, 
2003, Peacock, 2004).  Even though fingerprint 
scanners are becoming more reliable and 
cheaper to acquire, they still are subject to noise 
and wear and tear.  They require replacement 
approximately once a year and are difficult to 
place on remote access systems, such as a home 
computer used in a credit card purchase over the 
internet.  Iris scanners and more noise tolerant, 
but are certainly more expensive than fingerprint 
scanners.  In addition, they are (or at least appear 
to be) more intrusive – a very important factor in 
a biometric.  Any biometric solution that is to be 
used on the internet (and therefore accessed by 
potentially 100s of millions of users) must be 
effective and yet very unobtrusive. In the ideal 
case, we wish to provide a secure site that 
provides no hint that it is being heavily 
protected.  Alerting users to the fact that sites on 
the internet are subject to attack instills 
suspicion – the exact opposite sentiment the 
originators had for the internet.  It was designed 
to provide a medium where scientific 
information could be exchanged in an 
environment that was purely based on academic 
freedom.  In today’s world, the ideals can still 
exist, but may require a medium that is fortified 
with enhanced security features – the ethos of 
biometrics. 
 In this paper, we present evidence that 
keystroke dynamics is a viable biometric – that 
provides security on par with physiological 
methodologies.  In addition, it provides 
enhanced security in a very low-profile manner 
that is acceptable by the majority of users – 
virtually everyone is used to entering 
authentication details such as a login id and 
password.  The remaining question is whether 
keystroke dynamics – the typing style – 
measured in terms of keystroke/keypress 
duration and keyboard latency, combined with 
state-of-the-art machine learning techniques are 
sufficiently robust to provide the ability to 
discriminate between an authentic and imposter.  
If evidence can be shown that this is indeed the 
case – then behavioural biometrics – specifically 
keystrokes dynamics may provide a unique and 
effective solution to user authentication that can 
be used on personal machines as well as internet 
based applications. 
  In this paper, we will describe the basics of 
keystroke dynamics, followed by a machine 
learning algorithm – a probabilistic neural 
network on a dataset consisting of authentic and 
imposter login attempts.  We then present some 
key results of our work and a brief discussion 
and conclusion section. 
 
2. Keystroke dynamics 
 
Keystroke dynamics is a class of behavioural 
biometrics that captures the typing style of a 
user.  By typing style, we mean it examines how 
long it takes to type the login id/password, how 
long we depress a key, and how long we take to 
type successive keys – this is called a digraph.  
Figure 1 illustrates the classic example of the  
Figure 1.  The concept of a digraph – and the 
various combinations that can be extracted and used 
for biometric authentication.  In this aprticular 
example, the digraph is based on the character 
sequence ‘no.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data that can be extracted by entering two keys 
on a standard keyboard.  By collecting all 
possible digraphs from the login id/password – 
one can develop a model of how the person 
types these credentials.  Usually, there is an 
enrollment exercise, where the user is asked to 
enter his/her login id/password until a steady 
value for each digraph is obtained.  Once this 
data has been collected, a reference ‘signature’ 
is obtained for this user.  The reference is then 
used on subsequent login attempts – a user with 
that particular login id/password combination 
has their keystroke dynamics extracted and then 
compared with a stored reference value.  If they 
are within a prescribed tolerance limit – the user 
is authenticated.  If not – then the system can 
decide whether to lock up the workstation – or 
take some other suitable action.  When devising 
such a biometric solution – there is always a 
trade off between being overly stringent – 
rejecting every attempt to login in and being 
overly lenient – allowing imposters to access the 
computer.  The former is usually reported as a 
measure of false rejection – a type I error and 
the later a false acceptance or type II error.  
Another measure – called the cross over error 
rate (CER) - sometimes referred to as the equal 
error rate (EER) is also reported – they provide a 
measure of how sensitive the biometric is at 
balancing ease of use for the authentic user 
while at the same time reducing the imposter  
Figure 2. The cross-over error rate is indicated as the 
intersection between the FAR v FRR – when 
measured against a threshold. 
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access rate.  All extant biometric systems yield a 
trade-off between these two measures – those 
that reject imposters effectively (low FAR) are 
usually accompanied by a high FRR and vice 
versa.  Figure 2 depicts a typical plot of 
FAR/FRR and indicates the CER point – where 
the two plots intersect.  The critical research 
issue is ‘how can we lower the CER?’ In the 
next section, we describe the historical context 
in which keystroke dynamics has developed 
highlighting advances made in the 
methodological approaches to this critical 
question. 
 
2.1. Background 
 
In 1980 Gaines (Gaines, 1980) presented a 
report of his work to study the typing patterns of 
seven professional typists. The small number of 
volunteers and the fact that the algorithm is 
deducted from their data and not tested in other 
people later, results on a lower confidence on the 
FAR and FRR values presented. But the method 
used to establish a pattern was a breakthrough: a 
study of the time spent to type the same two 
letters (digraph), when together in the text. Since 
then, many algorithms based on Algebra and on 
Probability and Statistics have been presented. 
Joyce Gupta presented in 1990 (Gupta, 1990) an 
algorithm to calculate a value that represents the 
distance between acquired keystroke latency 
times and correspondent times previously stored. 
In 1997 Monrose and Rubin use the Euclidean 
Distance and probabilistic calculations based on 
the assumption that the latency times for one-
digraph exhibits a Normal Distribution 
(Monrose, 1997). Later, in 2000, they also 
present an algorithm for identification, based on 
the similarity models of Bayes, and in 2001 they 
present an algorithm that uses polynomials and 
vector spaces to generate complex passwords 
from a simple one, using the keystroke pattern 
(Monrose, 2001).  
Various fuzzy logic algorithms have been 
applied – mapping the variability in ones typing 
patterns to a fuzzy concept.  For instance, 
Hussein et al (Hussien, 1989, de Ru et al., 1997  
) use a combination of fuzzy clustering 
algorithms  - obtaining an error rate of 
approximately 5-10% - depending on the 
number of samples they acquired per login 
id/password combination.   Another study 
(Tapiador, 1999) employed a fuzzy rule set in 
order to classify login id/password combinations 
with somewhat better success than Hussein – 
although they report only their preliminary 
results. 
Techniques based on neural networks have 
been explored – focusing on ART-2 and multi-
layer perceptrons trained with the 
backpropagation algorithm.  For instance, 
Obadiat  provides data that suggests that the 
error rate can be reduced to approximately 2.4-
4.2%, depending on the exact pre-processing 
performed using a non-standard neural network 
(Obadiat, 1997).  Sung et al., has also applied 
neural networks (using standard 
backpropagation) to keystroke dynamics, 
generating error rates on the order of 2-4% 
(Sung, 2006). 
Other machine learning approaches, based on 
support vector machines (SVM) have been used 
to address the classification problem presented 
by keystroke dynamics.  De Oliveira et al (de 
Oliveira, 2005) have applied SVM to a small 
keystroke dataset and compare their results to 
standard neural network technology.  The 
authors claim that the SVM classifier is more 
efficient and at least as accurate as neural 
network technologies.  Sung et al. have also 
applied SVM to this domain, reporting an error 
rate of approximately 8-10% (Sung et a., 2006). 
Lastly, Revett et al. have used the rough sets 
induction algorithm to extract rules that form 
models for predicting the validity of a login 
id/password attempt (Revett et al., 2005).  The 
results indicate that the error rate can be as low 
as 2-4% in many cases. 
  The algorithms cited are a small example of the 
many approaches used to find adequate 
keystroke dynamics algorithms with a 
convenient CER. Many others could also be 
referred, all with different evaluation methods, 
different number of users involved (usually a 
limited number of users), different number of 
keystrokes required to enroll the system and 
different number of repetitive operations 
required to authenticate and/or identify the user. 
This diversity in the algorithm parameters and in 
the evaluation method makes the task of 
comparing their results a very difficult one. 
Furthermore, there is, in this subject, no concept 
of what is a representative data sample. The 
same algorithm presents different results when 
tested with different volunteer groups. The only 
way to compare two algorithms is to test it 
against the same group. 
Envisaging wide scale applications, like web-
based applications (where this method is not 
executable now) one must consider the results 
only if the test user group’s size is considerably 
large. In this application domain one must 
remember that the computational effort 
necessary to execute the algorithm is a critical 
factor.  This is one of the driving forces behind 
the approach we have adopted in this paper – we 
have implemented a probabilistic neural network 
(PNN) to classify whether a given login 
id/password combination belongs to the 
authentic user or an imposter.  A PNN is a 
highly accurate classifier and is very efficient for 
small datasets – here the dataset entails the 
details for an authentic user and a set of 
imposters selected randomly.  In these 
circumstances, we will provide evidence that 
this machine learning algorithm is as accurate as 
the leading results and is more efficient in many 
ways.  We describe the basis of the PNN 
algorithm in the next section. 
2.1. Probabilistic Neural Networks 
The PNNs are basically classifiers (Specht, 
1988). The general classification problem is to 
determine the category membership of a 
multivariate sample data (i.e. a p-dimensional 
random vector x) into one of q possible groups 
iΩ , i = 1, 2,…, q, based on a set of 
measurements. If we know the probability 
density functions (p.d.f.) fi(x), usually the 
Parzen-Cacoulos or Parzen like p.d.f.  
classifiers:  
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the a priori probabilities hi = P( iΩ ) of 
occurrence of patterns from categories iΩ  and 
the loss (or cost) parameters li  associated with 
all incorrect decisions given Ω  = iΩ , then, 
according to the Bayesian decision rule, we 
classify x into the category iΩ  if the inequality  
li hi fi(x) > lj hj fj(x) holds true. The standard 
training procedure for PNN requires a single 
pass over all the training patterns, giving them 
the advantage of being faster than the feed-
forward neural networks (Specht, 1988).  
Basically, the architecture of PNN is limited 
to three layers: the input/pattern layer, the 
summation layer and the output layer. Each 
input/pattern node forms a product of the input 
pattern vector x with a weight vector Wi and 
then perform a nonlinear operation, that is 
2exp[ ( ) ( ) /(2 )]i iW x W x
τ σ− − −  (assuming that 
both x and Wi are normalized to unit length), 
before outputting its activation level to the 
summation node. Each summation node receives 
the outputs from the input/pattern nodes 
associated with a given class and simply sums 
the inputs from the pattern units that correspond 
to the category from which the training pattern 
was selected, 2exp[ ( ) ( ) /(2 )]i i iW x W x
τ σ− − −∑ . 
The output nodes produce binary outputs by 
using the inequality: 
 
 2exp[ ( ) ( ) /(2 )]i i iW x W x
τ σ− − −∑ >       (2) 
2exp[ ( ) ( ) /(2 )]j j jW x W x
τ σ− − −∑   
 
related to two different categories iΩ  and jΩ .  
  The key to obtaining a good classification 
using PNN is to optimally estimate the two 
parameters of the Bayes decision rule, the 
misclassification costs and the prior 
probabilities. In our practical experiment we 
have estimate them heuristically. Thus, as 
concerns the costs parameters, we have 
considered them depending on the average 
distances Di, inversely proportional, that is li = 
1/Di. As concerns the prior probabilities, they 
measure the membership probability in each 
group and, thus, we have considered them equal 
to each group size, that is hi = mi. As in our 
previous work, we employed an evolutionary 
technique based on the genetic algorithm to find 
the smoothing parameters ( see Gorunescu et al, 
2005 for implementation details).  In the next 
section, we describe the experimental methods, 
with a brief description of the dataset. 
 
3. Methods 
 
  The dataset we examined consisted of a group 
of 50 subjects (all university students in a 
computer science department) – 20 acting as 
authentic users and the balance (30) acting as 
imposters. We asked the users to enter a login 
id/password of their choice (limit 15 characters 
for each) with an enrollment of 10 trials.  We 
utilised only their digraph latencies and scan 
code of the characters contained within their 
login id/passwords.   The data samples were 
collected over a 14-day period, throughout 
various periods of the day.  We maintained a 
running average of digraph values – where the 
oldest sample of 10 was replaced – leaving a set 
of 10 most recent login ids/password attempts.  
We invited 30 students to act as imposters, 
requesting that they attempt to hack into 
someone’s account by giving them their account 
holders login id/passwords.  They were given 2 
days to attempt over 500 trials of logging into all 
20 authentic accounts and the results were 
recorded.  We then used our PNN to generate a 
classifier that would be able to discriminate 
between an authentic user and an impostor – 
using subsets of the data thus obtained.  We 
cross validated our data in that we sampled with 
replacement until all datapoints were used in the 
classification and we report the average results 
from these experiments.   The particular version 
of the PNN we employed in this paper was the 
same as that employed in previous work 
(Gorunescu et al., 2005, Revett et al., 2005).  We 
also applied a modified version of our PNN 
algorithm, that used separate smoothing factors 
for each class (authentic and imposter).  We 
report both results in this work – and found that 
using a separate smoothing factor provided 
consistently better results. 
 
4. Results 
 
  We first describe an experiment where we 
examined which division used in the PNN gave 
us the best classification accuracy to determine 
which division provided the best accuracy.  We 
selected random samples for training and testing 
(70/30 in this case) and applied our PNN 
algorithm to these random samples. The data in 
Table 1 indicate that the classification accuracy 
was essentially independent on the number of 
divisions employed for this dataset.  Please note 
that the modified PNN algorithm yielded 
consistently higher results than one that 
employed the same smoothing factor for both 
classes – those results are not presented. 
 
Table 1. The classification results from the 
application of the modified PNN as a function of the 
number of divisions used.   The overall accuracy was 
0.099 (9.9%) for this experiment. 
 
Divisions TRAINING 
error 
TEST error 
10 0.0107 0.1153
20 0.0001 0.0884
30 0.0000 0.0942
40 0.0003 0.0923
50 0.0100 0.0961
60 0.0009 0.1153
70 0.0087 0.0903
80 0.0917 0.1003
90 0.0093 0.1076
100 0.0101 0.0923
In Table 2 below, we present the classification 
results after completely training the PNN on the 
entire dataset, reporting the FAR and FRR as a 
function of division values. 
   
Table 2.  FAR/FRR values as a function of the 
division level (the same values reported in Table 
1).  Note the values must be multiplied by 100 to 
give percentages. The values in the last row of 
the right-most columns are the averages of their 
respective columns. 
 
 
Division 
points 
False 
acceptance 
False 
rejection 
10 0.0483 0.0481
20 0.0192 0.0197
30 0.0576 0.0376
40 0.0576 0.0566
50 0.0576 0.0483
60 0.0001 0.0021
70 0.0576 0.0598
80 0.0481 0.0483
90 0.0288 0.0312
100 0.0480 0.0427
 0.0422 0.0394
 
 
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that our 
FAR/FRR is on the order of 4% - with a total 
error rate of 8.1% approximately.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
  We have successfully applied our modified 
Specht PNN to difficult biomedical datasets and 
have obtained accuracy levels comparable to 
other more traditional methods.  In this study, 
we have employed our modified PNN to a small 
dataset of login id/password digraph samples.  
The modified classifier performed better than 
the standard PNN algorithm by approximately 
20% (data not shown).  Once trained, the 
classifier was able to minimise the FAR without 
significantly compromising the FRR (both were 
approximately 4%).  These results are 
comparable to traditional neural network 
approaches as well as more ‘modern’ 
approaches such as SVM.   The computational 
time required to train the PNN was minimal – on 
the order of 2 minutes on a standard Pentium IV 
desktop computer with low-to-typical amounts 
of memory (128 MB) and processing speed (1 
GHz).   
    It must be noted that these results were 
obtained without any data pre-processing.  We 
simply collected the data, selected a random  
subset for training (70%) and 30% for testing.  
This algorithm is time efficient when login 
id/password credentials are used for 
authentication purposes.  It is a well known fact 
that the training phase of the PNN algorithm 
begins to degrade in terms of time efficiency 
when the sample numbers are large.  But in this 
area of application, where we have a relatively 
small number of samples for training (on the 
order of 10-50) – and can select an equal number 
of testing samples, training performance is not 
an issue.   This is in contrast to other techniques 
such as the backpropagation algorithm that 
requires a substantial number of training data in 
order to generate accurate classification.  These 
advantages make the PNN a very suitable 
candidate for a novel machine learning 
algorithm in the context of keystroke dynamics 
authentication. 
  We will continue to pursue the use of PNNs for 
this particular domain - focusing on larger 
datasets to see how the training time scales with 
the number of users in the system.  In addition, 
we may consider some unsupervised pre-
processing of the data such as self-organised 
maps.  It is important to remember that if this 
system is going to be used as an on-line 
authentication algorithm – data pre-processing 
must be kept to a minimum if it is to operate in 
an unsupervised manner – which may be a 
critical aspect of an on-line verification system.  
One must decide how much human effort must 
be spent in this process.  Reduction of the pre-
processing stage also tends to reduce the extent 
of overfitting the data. 
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